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South Africa has undoubtedly made significant progress since the end of apartheid 
and the adoption of a very progressive Constitution and legislation, protecting civil, 
economic and social rights. Nevertheless, popular frustration with the current 
leadership seems to be growing, as testified to by numerous episodes of violent 
strikes, xenophobic reactions and by the protest vote against the then ANC leadership 
during its December 2007 conference. This paper explores the evolution of labour 
conditions since the 1994 democratisation in three key sectors of the South African 
economy – mining, forestry and agriculture. Drawing on extensive empirical research, 
it argues that the post-apartheid era has witnessed a marked increase in the 
precariousness of workers' statuses and situations. Despite formal labour market 
regulation, processes of externalisation have been pervasive, turning previously 
oppressed wage labourers into poor, casualised workers eking a living in a liberalised 
economy. South Africa's socio-economic policies have decisively contributed to this 
outcome. The paradox is all the more important with regard to the high expectations 
associated with the transition; it epitomises the difficult restructuring of South African 
society. 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa is presently affected by violent strikes and reactions. For example, in 
April and May 2008, a wave of xenophobic attacks targeting African immigrants in 
South Africa has shocked the world. Leaving 62 people dead and thousands injured, it 
has incited hundreds of thousands to leave their homes and sometimes the country1. A 
number of analyses have pointed out the huge number of immigrants (some surveys 
estimate the number of illegal aliens in the country to be more than 10,000,000 – 
about 25% of the total population), in particular Zimbabweans who have fled the 
economic collapse of their country. Popular stories, found in particular in the South 
African edition of The Sun newspaper, have insisted on the links (yet to be 
established) of these immigrants with criminal networks, on the social advantages (in 
particular Government houses) from which they have benefited, and on the jobs they 
are employed in while many South Africans remain unemployed. Another tragic event 
                                                
1 CORMSA (Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa), 2008, Protecting Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers in South Africa, 19 June, Johannesburg, www.cormsa.org.za, consulted on the 27th October 2008. 
occurred only a month ago, when police opened fire during clashes with striking 
workers at the Marikana platinum mine, leaving at least 30 people dead. The third 
largest platinum mine in the world, owned by Lonmin, has been at the centre of a 
violent pay dispute, exacerbated by tensions between two rival trade unions. Here 
again, as in the many other examples that could be cited (refs), labour issues are at the 
core of the frustrations. 
 
Indeed, in a country where inequality is still one of the highest in the world, it is 
hardly surprising that demands for improved working and living conditions are 
making themselves heard. What is worrying is that they are expressed with increasing 
violence while debates are confined within the ruling tripartite Alliance. Behind these 
observations, the violence of these manifestations is the display of a profound 
disappointment with the social and economic outcomes of the transition from 
apartheid. It conveys a strong message: there is a growing disenchantment with the 
“New” South Africa. Failing to acknowledge it, could be dangerous. Significant of 
this disenchantment is that Mr. Zuma registered a landslide victory over Thabo Mbeki 
to become ANC President at its Polokwane Congress in December 2007; he is widely 
seen as crystallising the hopes of the many South Africans who feel that they have not 
been able to reap the benefits they expected since the end of the apartheid regime in 
1994. However, Zuma’s late appearance and his poor handling of the situation at the 
Lonmin mine led to former ANC Youth League president to ask the resignation of the 
Nation’s President (and the minister of Defence), showing the continuous pressure on 
labour relations in the country. 
 
This paper will attempt to shed light on the political economy of South Africa by 
focusing on an essential, yet often overlooked, cause for frustration among the 
majority of South Africans, namely their inability to access satisfactory jobs since 
1994. Although the persistence of high unemployment is an essential part of this 
phenomenon, the article focuses on the evolution of working conditions and argues 
that, while important changes have taken place, exploitation and poor working 
relations have all but disappeared within a context characterised by outsourcing, 
casualisation and an increase in the number of foreign workers. Therein lies the South 
African paradox: In the last and richest African country to have been freed, where 
white political rule was more than ever linked to wealth accumulation and 
inequalities, liberation has carried great expectations; yet its citizens are bitterly 
disappointed and frustrated. 
 
In the first section, we emphasize the great expectations that were associated with the 
end of the apartheid workplace regime and the substantial revamping of labour law. In 
the following three sections, we look at the changes that have taken place in three 
selected sectors: mining, forestry and agriculture. Our perspective is firmly rooted in a 
reliance on case studies as opposed to abstract generalisations derived from large 
datasets, notwithstanding the latter’s value when they are rooted in a qualitative 
understanding of their object – and when the data is reliable. The sectoral diversity of 
legal regimes, institutional frameworks and economic conditions under apartheid 
further support our decision to analyse the evolution of working conditions in three 
sectors of the South African economy: mining, forestry and agriculture. Chosen for 
their historical and economic importance in South Africa (they represented 15% of the 
working population and 17.7% of GDP in 2005), these sectors were characterised by 
violent labour relations during apartheid and have experienced rapid (albeit multi-
faceted) casualisation of labour thereafter. They present varying degrees of 
unionisation and linkage to international capitalism. Mining is an industrial sector that 
is deeply integrated with the global economy, with historically powerful unions. 
Forestry, a semi-industrial sector integrated into a number of local and global value 
chains, has seen its rate of unionisation collapse since the beginning of the 1990s. 
Agriculture, on the other hand, although its production became more export oriented, 
remains a conservative sector still characterised by paternalistic labour relations and 
weak unions. In the last section, we conclude by highlighting that the casualisation of 
working conditions in South Africa has triggered a crisis of reproduction which 
reveals the striking (and probably unsustainable) insufficiency of the transformation 
of the country’s economy. 
 
Great expectations: Into the Post-Apartheid Workplace Regime 
 
Social relations of production in contemporary South Africa have been heavily shaped 
by a violent history. Wage labour regimes have been remodelled by continuous social 
and political conflicts experienced in the country since the late 19th century. As noted 
by Makgetla2, the apartheid regime (and before this the British and South African 
colonial regimes) intentionally weakened the position of Blacks both as capitalists and 
as labourers by maintaining a situation of structural under-unemployment. This was 
aimed at protecting the socio-economic position of all Whites (notably the poor and 
least educated) while providing white capitalists with a cheap and tractable black 
workforce, drawn from an impoverished “reserve army of labour”, ready to accept 
whatever work was on offer3. 
 
At the heart of the apartheid political regime lay racially segregated and highly 
unequal labour rights. Beyond employment opportunities, the panoply of rights that 
white workers benefited from (union rights, social security, medical insurance, 
unemployment fund, access to labour courts) contrasted with the State’s efforts to 
weaken African workers, whether by subverting their organisations or by direct 
attacks4. White power was such that the permanent and often violent assertion of 
racial domination blurred the lines between productive tasks and personal services. At 
a “mixed” workplace, like the Highveld steel factory studied by Von Holdt5, a black 
worker always had to be at the service of a white worker, whether the latter was his 
superior or not. The professional status of Blacks relegated them to the least qualified, 
most gruelling tasks for which they received miserly wages; their status did not allow 
them to contest unfair practices or dismissal, deprived them of any indirect wage such 
as pension or insurance, and of all potential for professional advancement. If 
employers’ practices allowed it, only the few Blacks who were in formal employment 
                                                
2 N. Makgetla, ‘The challenge of employment and equity in the workplace’, in South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC), Reflections on Democracy and Human Rights: A Decade of the South 
African Constitution (Johannesburg, SAHRC, 2006), pp.37-53. 
3 H. Wolpe. ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid’, in 
H.Wolpe (ed.), The Articulation of Modes of Production (Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). 
NUMEROS DE PAGES?? Pas trouve mais ALSO PUBLISHED AS ARTICLE: H. Wolpe, 1972, 
Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid’, Economy and 
Society, Vol. 1, pp. 425-56. 
4 Makgetla, ‘The challenge of employment and equity in the workplace’ 
5 K. Von Holdt, Transition from Below: Forging Trade Unionism and Workplace Change in South 
Africa (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 2003) 
(from which all temporary workers were excluded) had the capacity to bargain for 
improved working conditions.6 
 
Apartheid generated individual workplace resistance from its outset, but working 
conditions only started improving in the wake of the violent strikes of 1973 in 
Durban. Von Holdt shows how blurring the distinction between racial and technical 
hierarchies, on top of being inefficient, generated a humiliation and a frustration that 
at that stage played a decisive role in the emergence of unions. Soon the individual 
actions were followed by increasingly structured union contestation which pushed the 
government to adopt the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1979 and to recognise black 
workers’ unions. New rights sparked the extension of conflict in the workplace and 
beyond, marking a turn in South African history. The increase of power of black 
unions drastically modified the status of wage labour and played a decisive role in the 
political turmoil that brought about the end of apartheid. In 1994, after the first 
democratic elections, a tripartite alliance between the ANC, the South African 
Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU7) took 
power, bringing hope for better living and working conditions to the majority of South 
Africans. In 1995, one year after apartheid officially ended, the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) restructured the relationships between employers and employees. Two years 
later, in 1997, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) provided a clear and 
inclusive definition of an employee, which covered all workers (except the self-
employed) and strictly regulated working conditions (45 working hours per week, 21 
days of leave per year, sick leave entitlement, etc.). While some of the regulations 
detailed in the BCEA concern all sectors (unemployment insurance, retrenchment 
funds, etc.), a number of social protection measures (pension funds and different types 
of insurance) depend on negotiated agreements within each business or branch. It is 
for this reason that the BCEA provides a mechanism, sectoral determination, which 
allows the Minister of Labour to intervene in defining the minimum remuneration and 
working conditions in a given sector if workers are insufficiently unionised to 
negotiate with their employers.8  
 
The legal design of the post-apartheid labour regime reveals its (intended) 
collaborative nature and bears a striking resemblance to the Northern-European model 
of industrial relations. The latter’s appeal to COSATU and to the liberation movement 
at large reflects the popular rejection of what Von Holdt calls the “apartheid 
workplace regime”9 and signals a will to entrench the social gains obtained during the 
twenty years that preceded the first democratic elections. It is at odds with the market-
oriented model promoted by institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, who followed closely the ANC and the South African transition and 
sought to influence them10. The violence associated with recent xenophobic outbursts 
                                                
6 Makgetla, ibid. 
7 In 1983, Black union movements were consolidated into a powerful rally consisting of more than half 
a million supporters and 34 unions, COSATU. See E. Webster and G. Adler, ‘Towards a Class 
Compromise in South Africa’s “Double Transition”: Bargained Liberalisation and the Consolidation of 
Democracy’, paper presented at the workshop “Labour and popular struggles in the global economy” 
(New York City, Columbia University, 17 November 1998). 
8 An employer is obliged to recognise a union once the rate of unionisation reaches 50% plus one 
person. See E. Donnelly and S.R. Dunn, ‘Ten Years After: South African Employment Relations Since 
the Negotiated Revolution’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44, 1 (2006), pp.1-29. 
9 K. Von Holdt, Transition from Below. 
10 E. Donnelly and S.R. Dunn, ‘Ten Years After’. 
draws attention to the fact that the social and economic expectations of many poor 
South Africans have not been fulfilled. While one cannot ignore the progress made 
with the adoption of a very progressive Constitution and subsequent legislation, which 
enhanced the protection of civil, economic and social rights, several dynamics have 
constrained the awaited improvements of working and living conditions. They will be 
explored through the description of the evolution of labour conditions within three of 
South Africa’s main economic sectors. 
 
Mining Affected by Liberalisation and Subcontracting  
 
The mining sector has played a central role in South African history. It was for many 
years one of the nation’s primary employers and it has deeply shaped social relations 
of production. Accounting for between 30 and 15% of GDP, the mining sector 
employed respectively 489,000 people in the 1940s and 758,000 at the beginning of 
the 1990s, representing on average approximately 10% of South Africa’s formal 
employment11. The capitalisation required to enable extraction led to a concentration 
of mining capital and ownership among several large companies. Not only leading to 
the conditions of “petty-bourgeois production” through corporate mergers, these few 
companies influenced and structured the entire sector, if not the whole economy12. 
Indeed, since the beginning of the 20th century, in the years following the discovery of 
diamonds in Kimberley in 1867 and of gold in Johannesburg in 1886, the South 
African economy has been organised around a “minerals-energy complex” (MEC), a 
term coined by Fine and Rustomjee in their landmark study of 199613. In order to 
supply this sector with an abundant and cheap workforce, specific social relations of 
production as well as spatial configurations were developed. The division of labour 
and tasks was strongly related to race, as illustrated by the separation between white 
‘miners’ (allowed to work with explosives) and black ‘mineworkers’ (confined to 
basic tasks such as hand-digging or excavating) – a practice going back to the early 
1920s14. This organisation of production was complemented by a system based on the 
employment of migrant workers travelling from territories reserved for non-Whites 
(the Bantustans) and neighbouring countries (Lesotho and Swaziland, but also 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique)15. This spatial structure was integral to the 
apartheid legal framework16 and persisted until 199417. 
 
Since the 1970s, the mining sector has become increasingly dependent on South 
African workers as a result of the partial loss of control over foreign labourers 
(following the independence of several southern African countries) and of the 
                                                
11 See Statistics South Africa (SSA), Labour Force Survey (Pretoria, SSA, Statistical Release P0210, 
2006). 
12 D. Innes, Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa, (London, Heinemann Educational, 
1984). 
13 B. Fine and Z. Rustomjee, The Political Economy of South Africa. From Minerals-Energy Complex 
to Industrialisation (London, Hurst, 1996). 
14 F.A. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold: A Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in 
South Africa (London, Routledge, 1976). 
15 R.E.B. Lucas, ‘Mines and Migrants in South Africa’, American Economic Review, 75, 5 (1985), 
pp.1094–1108. 
16 T.D. Moodie and V. Ndatshe, Going for Gold: Men, Mines and Migration (Johannesburg, 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1994). 
17 W. Anseeuw, La reconversion professionelle vers l’agriculture marchande et politiques publiques. Le 
case des mineurs du Northern Cape (PhD Thesis, Université Pierre Mendès-France, 2004) 
increase of local labour demand, which has led to an increase in wages (+320% 
between 1980 and 1985) in order to compete against other labour-intensive sectors18. 
Combined with the rising value of gold and the growing power of unions since the 
early 1980s19, this situation favoured the emergence of far-reaching demands, which 
led to sectoral agreements on the distribution of value added and working conditions. 
In addition to higher salaries compared to other sectors, mine workers generally 
benefited from well-defined, full-time, indefinite duration contracts. Indirect salaries 
and social protection were also important, partially protecting mine workers against 
the risks of unemployment, illness, disability or dismissal. Labour law covering issues 
such as working hours or sick leave was respected and health and safety regulations 
were relatively well abidden by. Mineworkers often benefited from additional 
advantages (pension funds, multiple forms of insurance, living and food 
allowances)20. 
 
Improvements in working conditions began to reverse following the restructuring of 
the sector initiated after the major strike of 1987 and the liberalisation process of the 
1990s. The concomitant decrease in international mineral prices resulted in mines 
struggling to cover their labour costs, which had risen from 25 % to over 50% of 
overall production costs, initially triggering a substitution of labour with capital21. The 
South African mining workforce decreased from 750 000 in 1990, 402 000 in 1999 up 
to 288 400 in 200522. Moreover, since the 1990s, the sector has witnessed the 
emergence of companies adopting new organisational models and outsourcing the 
workforce en masse. Facilitated by the liberalisation of the economy, these trends 
have deeply impacted the working conditions of mine workers. 
 
First, liberalisation and the withdrawal of the State following the end of apartheid 
were accompanied by a political desire to undermine the power of oligopolies in the 
mining sector. Besides the many larger South African companies and conglomerates 
moving abroad or registering offshore23, the opening of markets has allowed the 
emergence of new, medium-sized, often foreign-owned mining enterprises which 
generally benefit from temporary licenses for mines whose rights they rent from large 
South African mining companies. In addition, since 1998, a programme aimed at 
increasing investment, business creation and employment has promoted small-scale, 
mainly Black-run mining activities, often on agricultural land and sometimes in the 
former Bantustans. Such businesses have rapidly developed and, although their 
production is difficult to quantify, Anseeuw estimated in a study conducted in 2000 
that workers employed by these new companies represented 24% of the mining 
                                                
18 J. Wilmot, Our Precious Metal: African Labour in South Africa’s Industry, 1970-1990 (London, 
James Currey, 1992).  
19 The concentration of the workforce facilitated the organisation of powerful unions. As such, the 
National Union of Mine Workers, created in 1982 to rally miners, was the most powerful union in 
South Africa for a long time and constituted an essential keystone of COSATU. 
20 For more information, see V.L. Allen, The History of Black Mineworkers in South Africa (3 
Volumes) (West Yorkshire, The Moor Press, 1992-2005). 
21 J. Hayem, ‘Fin d’apartheid en Afrique du Sud: quels enjeux pour l’industrie minière et les mineurs 
sud-africains?’, in J-C. Rabier, Actes du Colloque International « Formes de mobilisation dans les 
régions d’activités minières » (Lille, Université Lille 1/Ifresi, 24-26 May 2000). 
22 SSA, Labour Force Survey. The number of miners has since stabilised primarily because of the 
increases in global demand for titanium and platinum, as well as the increased price of gold. 
23 P. Carmody, ‘Between Globalisation and (Post) Apartheid: The Political Economy of Restructuring 
in South Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 28, 2 (2002), pp. 255-275. 
workforce24. All these new companies are generally investing in temporary mining 
activities, the profitability of which mainly depends on a considerable reorganisation 
of labour. As such, productivity gains are generally realised thanks to a reduction in 
production costs achieved through the deterioration of working and living conditions 
of labourers. 
 
Second, outsourcing of labour has developed rapidly25; initially concerning so-called 
side or secondary activities such as catering, accommodation, and social services, 
outsourcing increasingly impacts core productive activities. Two different types of 
contracting have been observed in the mining sector26. The first can be considered to 
be “formal”: contractors are legally registered companies that allocate their workers to 
different companies; a labour surplus in one mine can be absorbed by another. In this 
case, contracting is not a means to circumvent labour laws or branch agreements, nor 
is it geared to prevent union organising, but it aims to create a more flexible work 
organisation. Indeed, mining companies have imposed on their formal contractors, 
often due to union pressure, work conditions more or less comparable to their own. 
However, contracting often goes hand in hand with a deterioration of working 
conditions. This sort of contracting can be called “informal”. Workers employed by 
these contractors are typically offered less advantageous working conditions. Such 
practices are observed in all types of mining companies, who apply them to evade 
certain legislative requirements and limit union action. In these cases, subcontracting 
becomes mainly a means to change working conditions without having to negotiate 
with workers or their unions. Though little recent data is available, Crush noted that in 
1997, 5% of coal mine workers worked on subcontracts27, while in 1999 Streek 
estimated that the rate of workers on subcontracts in the mining industry was in 
general above 30% (50% of whom were foreigners)28. Anseeuw, in his study 
conducted in 2000, estimated that 12% of workers were “informally” subcontracted29. 
 
Except for formal subcontracting, recent processes associated with the liberalisation 
of the mining sector, i.e. new mining enterprises and informal subcontracting, have 
thus led to a deterioration of working conditions. These new models are characterised 
by low investment and intense labour exploitation: lower production costs are 
achieved through the deterioration of labour situations, which become very 
precarious, even illegal. When they are declared, employees are often hired on 
temporary (sometimes daily) contracts. This change goes hand in hand with a less 
advantageous employment status and decreased security, an important reduction in 
direct (which are neither indexed nor negotiated) and indirect wages, as well as with a 
degradation of physical working conditions (the 45-hour work week is often not 
respected). Compared to the initial conditions of large mining companies, Anseeuw 
estimates that the average decrease in direct salaries is 65% on average, for increased 
                                                
24 W. Anseeuw, La reconversion professionelle, p. 155. 
25 E. Webster and R. Omar, ‘Work restructuring in post-apartheid South Africa’, Work and 
Occupations, 30, 2(2003), pp. 194-213; E. Webster and K. Von Holdt (eds.), Beyond the Apartheid 
Workplace. Studies in Transition (Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005). 
26 W. Anseeuw, La reconversion professionelle. 
27 J. Crush, ‘Contract Migration to South Africa: past, present and future’, research report prepared for 
the Green Paper on International Migration (Kingston, Queen’s University, South African Migration 
Project, 1997), available at www.queensu.ca/samptransform/crush.htm. 
28 B, Streek, ‘Subcontracting Explodes on Mines’, Mail & Guardian, (1-7 October 1999). 
29 W. Anseeuw, La reconversion professionnelle. 
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working hours and more difficult and strenuous tasks30. These workers do not have 
unemployment (or any other) insurance or pension fund and their temporary status 
does not include holidays or sick leave. In addition, employment often depends on 
available work and on actual profits: mine workers are forced to assume part of the 
business risk of the company. This model of organisation allows employers to access 
a flexible, cheap and tractable workforce, which in addition is not in a position to 
bargain for improvements: labour insecurity discourages mineworkers from joining a 
union or from attempting to negotiate better working conditions. The employees of 
temporary mine exploitations or of the majority of the subcontracted activities are 
thus unlikely to ever benefit from the current high mineral prices. The casualisation of 
work observed in South African mines finds its equivalent in many countries 
confronted with globalisation, but liberalisation also has, as will be demonstrated, 
more specific consequences in less integrated and less unionised sectors. 
 
South African Forestry in Crisis: A Worst-Practice of Outsourcing? 
 
The South African timber industry developed from the beginning of the 20th century 
and was the driving force behind the emergence of numerous tree plantations31. 
Contrary to Central Africa, Southern Africa has a modest area under natural forest 
cover: in 1999, forests represented approximately 0.3% of the South African 
territory32. Plantations are constituted of imported species, mainly pine and 
eucalyptus, which are replanted shortly after felling. Like many South African 
industries, the timber industry was first at the service of the minerals-energy complex; 
until the 1960s, demand for timber mostly came from the mining sector, as well as 
from construction33. The State played a direct role in the establishment of plantations 
to overcome the risks inherent in this type of investment, where the return takes many 
years to be realised. From the 1960s onwards, the State supported the growth of the 
pulp and paper industry through a variety of subsidies and credit facilities, intended in 
particular for two private companies which have since become global players: Sappi 
and Mondi, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Group. Although the expansion of 
South African plantations was slightly curbed after 1972 in order to regulate their 
impact on river flows, the timber industry represented in 2003 a value added of 1.35 
billion euros, or 1% of South Africa’s GDP, and employed more than 170 000 people, 
60 000 of which in forestry34. But, since the end of the 1980s, the sector has been 
experiencing a crisis which it struggles to overcome and which is linked – as we will 
see – to the outsourcing of forestry operations. 
 
The contracting of forestry operations began in the late 1980s, at the time when urban 
unrest against the apartheid regime reached rural areas and forestry workers, in large 
                                                
30 Ibid., pp. 160-165. 
31 The “timber industry” includes forestry and primary transformation industries (saw mills, pulp and 
paper etc.). The term “forestry” covers the production cycle of timber, from growing trees 
(sylviculture) to felling, debarking and transport. 
32 J. Mayers, J. Evans, and T. Foy, Raising the Stakes. Impacts of Privatisation, Certification and 
Partnerships in South African Forestry (London: International Institute for Environment and 
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33 WJA Louw, ‘General History of the South African Forest Industry’, Southern African Forestry 
Journal, 200 (2004), pp. 77-86. 
34 D. Chamberlain, H. Essop, C. Hougaard, S. Malherbe & R. Walker, The Contribution, Costs and 
Development Opportunities of the Forestry, Timber Pulp, and Paper Industries in South Africa 
(Johannesburg, Genesis, 2005). 
part through the activism of unionised factory (paper- and sawmills) workers35. Until 
2000, large forestry companies insisted that they relied on contractors to improve 
productivity, alleging that entrepreneurs should be more productive than managers36. 
Forestry companies outsourced their entire operations in a few years’ time, 
encouraging their foresters – all Whites – to set themselves up as contractors. The first 
to outsource were the pulp and paper giants, Sappi and Mondi, whose activities were 
traditionally integrated vertically “from stump to mill” and who are referred to as 
growers-producers (GPs). Production of timber was in effect subsidised by that of 
pulp and paper, which have a much higher market value. By contracting the most 
labour-intensive part of their activities, the GPs effectively transferred risks to their 
contractors, paying them for actual production only without providing them with any 
technical assistance37. 
 
Forestry, a fortiori when deprived of the support of downstream transformation 
industries, is a risky activity, marred by low timber prices, very small margins and 
vulnerability to weather variations (mostly impacting debarking and transportation). 
The organisation of production in the sector is draconian and profits depend on strict 
controls of production and costs. But outsourcing was accompanied by an aggressive 
strategy by the GPs to reduce the remuneration of contractors. They exacerbated a 
“race to the bottom” price competition and prevented contractors from collectively 
negotiating annual remuneration increases, by threatening them individually not to 
award them a contract38. There are no available figures to determine the evolution of 
the remuneration of contractors, but it is likely that it increased on average less 
quickly than inflation since the beginning of the 1990s, reducing real income 
considerably. A study conducted in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa’s main forestry 
province along with Mpumalanga, estimated the bankruptcy rate of contractors to be 
more than 40% in 200439. It is emphasised in this study that ‘although contracting is in 
theory about a commercial relationship based on provision of services, in reality there 
is such a power imbalance between the GPs and the contractors, such that it better 
resembles an employment relationship’40. 
 
The insistence of forestry companies to remunerate their contractors as little as 
possible contributed to the development of subcontracting, sometimes chain 
subcontracting (i.e. contracting out by contractors), most often outside any formal 
rules. These new entrepreneurs are usually Blacks who work for white contractors and 
employ unskilled workers, often women and illegal migrants, living near their place 
of residence. This evolution is paradoxically seen as progressive from the point of 
view of the national Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) policy, 
which supports the creation of small Black-owned businesses as part of a 
development and poverty reduction strategy. But most of these entrepreneurs struggle 
to keep their businesses afloat; reimbursing debts accumulated to finance the business 
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is often the main motivation to continue until bankruptcy. Moreover, the difficulties 
they experience to insure the reproduction of their means of production often leads to 
the suffocation of the household income. Small contractors tend to “divert” resources 
from the family budget (school fees, food) to pay workers or fix equipment41. In other 
words, they experience a reproduction squeeze as they exhaust domestic resources 
(reproduction as labour) in order to keep their business afloat (reproduction as 
capital); they are rather akin to the African petty commodity producers described by 
Bernstein than to promising capitalists42. The forestry industry has thus greatly 
suffered from outsourcing: the bankruptcy of many foresters turned contractors has 
deprived the sector of qualified professionals; productivity and production have 
declined and the number of criminal acts on plantations (arson, timber theft, etc.) are 
on the rise43. 
 
This crisis has profoundly affected the forestry workforce, leading to a rapid 
casualisation of working conditions. The risk that forestry companies are unloading 
onto their contractors is in large part assumed by the workers themselves, who are 
subject to task work (i.e. they are paid upon completion of a set task rather than of a 
work day). This practice, common in forestry, has become a means of intolerable 
exploitation: the task is indexed on the productivity necessary to achieve the 
production stipulated in the contract between the forestry company and the contractor, 
rather than on the physical capacity of workers. Many of them are paid between 300 
and R500 per month for hard and often dangerous labour. The tasks demanded are 
often beyond workers’ physical capacity, they are usually not given adequate training 
and lack experience and proper equipment. Their resulting inability to perform the 
required tasks allows contractors to underpay them and reduce costs. A frequently 
observed mechanism to transfer production risks to workers is the refusal to adapt 
tasks to changing weather conditions, a determining factor notably for debarking, 
since dry bark is very hard to tear. The daily “task race” pushes workers to take risks, 
further increasing the danger associated with forestry work. Employers are however 
very reluctant to recognise work-related injuries; they often do not pay their insurance 
contributions and their principal companies threaten not to renew their contract if the 
number of reported accidents increases. Living conditions in forestry compounds have 
also deteriorated largely due to widespread overpopulation in these “worker villages”, 
isolated in the middle of plantations, and to the withdrawal of GPs from their direct 
management. Compound management has indeed also been outsourced, with as little 
supervision as other forestry activities; cases of workers living in crowded tents are 
frequent in Mpumalanga. 
 
In rural areas, until the 1990s, forestry workers formed a sort of proleterarian elite 
when compared to workers in agriculture, because they were employed by large 
companies who conceded a number of social advantages, often as a result of action by 
workers in transformation industries. Due to the impact of outsourcing, forestry has 
come to be seen as a last resort and many prefer to work in sugar cane or citrus 
plantations, where conditions are reputed to be very difficult. All indirect incomes 
have been cut from forestry workers’ wages and the duration of contracts, sometimes 
based on the contractors’ (generally one year), has often been shortened to three 
months. More and more women and foreigners, often illegal Mozambicans, 
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Zimbabweans or Swazis, replace the “traditional” male South African workers who 
made up the majority of the labour force during the era of vertical integration. 
 
Although union mobilisation played a decisive role in the improvement of working 
conditions in the forestry sector in the 1980s, its efficiency was linked to an alliance 
with factory workers, for example in sawmills, who were better organised than 
plantation workers. The contracting out of forestry operations separated the two 
groups of workers, and the separation was entrenched in the mid-1990s with 
COSATU’s creation of SAAPAWU (South African Agricultural, Plantations and 
Allied Workers Union), which organised agricultural workers together with their 
counterparts in forestry, previously organised by PPWAWU (Paper, Printing, Wood 
and Allied Workers Union). The attempt to organise jointly two of the weakest groups 
of workers (in forestry and agriculture) in conditions of growing casualisation turned 
out to be a failure and the union soon collapsed. Membership declined and 
negotiations with forestry employers were difficult, since the latter, from a handful of 
GPs, were now made up of hundreds of contractors. Numerous micro unions, often 
with questionable practices, appeared in areas left uncovered by COSATU-affiliated 
unions. In 2004, the failure of SAAPAWU was made apparent by its merger into 
FAWU (Food and Allied Workers Union), which until present has not succeeded in 
halting the collapse of unions in forestry. The failure of unions to protect forestry 
workers is obvious, and the causes are at least partially found in their division, which 
happened at the same time as a far-reaching structural change in the organisation in 
the industry was taking place. 
 
The publication, in March 2006, of a forestry sectoral determination44 demonstrates 
the government’s recognition of the inability of unions to represent and defend 
forestry workers. The Minister prohibited that task payment be applied to the entire 
wage of forestry workers, declaring that the minimum wage was to be given in full 
and that he could not ‘tolerate employer’s argument according to which task-based 
work without a guaranteed minimum wage ensures that “lazy” workers do what is 
asked of them’45. However, one can doubt the impact that this ministerial 
determination will have in a sector where the deficiency of unions and the 
precariousness of workers render the reporting of violations unlikely, especially when 
labour inspectors are notoriously understaffed46. However, the fact that state 
intervention was necessary reflects the severity of the problems of working relations 
in rural areas, as further documented below. 
 
The Agricultural Sector, a Failure to Secure Land and Labour 
 
In comparison with forestry and mining, the history of South African agricultural 
labour is found as much, if not more, in the pattern of land appropriation as it is in 
labour legislation. Indeed, colonial history and the expropriation of indigenous 
people, especially since the land laws of 1913 and 1936 (Native Land Acts), have 
shaped working and living conditions. 
 
                                                
44 Department of Labour, ‘Sectoral Determination 12: Forestry Sector’ (Pretoria: Government Gazette, 
17 March 2006) 
45 Press communiqué published on 15 March 2006 on www.infogov.za/speeches. 
46 Follow-up research on the impact of the determination will be carried out by the author in 2009. 
After the migration of the Boers (the “Great Trek”) in the 19th century and the 
appropriation of much land by settlers, many non-Whites were confined to small, 
scattered and infertile pieces of land, often leaving them with the sole option to 
become sharecroppers on white farmland47. In addition, the laws of 1913 and 1936 
attributed precisely 8% then 13% of South African land to non-Whites, who 
represented approximately 80% of the population. These laws confined Coloureds in 
reserves and Blacks in Bantustans, where land tenure was kept uncertain and 
agricultural practice was supposed to remain communal. Although these measures 
first served the objective of land appropriation by Whites, leading to the displacement 
of millions of non-Whites, they also aimed at suffocating the black peasantry48. 
Subordinated and deprived of their own economic resources, these populations 
became a reserve army of labour for white agriculture and industries for which, as 
seen above, a system of migrant work from the reserves and the Bantustans was 
established. These laws also allowed Whites to evict black workers living on their 
land and facilitated the hardening of labour conditions. Sharecropping agreements – 
considered to be generous towards Blacks – were questioned and gradually 
transformed into paid agricultural labour and, in Natal, into “labour tenants”, a system 
in which work was supplied in exchange for the right to live on the farm land49. 
 
By the end of apartheid, living conditions of farm workers (either paid workers or 
labour tenants) had deteriorated considerably: in addition to the 3.5 million Blacks 
that were expelled from their land between 1950 and 1980, about 1.4 million people, 
during the same period, and an additional 730 000 people in the last 10 years of 
apartheid were chased from White-owned land50. Furthermore, until 1994, farm 
workers did not have the right to organise themselves or to join a union. Their 
working conditions were less than mediocre: difficult tasks and workdays frequently 
in excess of 12 hours for extremely low wages, often paid in kind. The relationships 
between farm workers and owners were characterised by dependence and 
paternalism51: Not only was permission to reside on the farm dependent on work, 
making it liable to be revoked with loss of employment; workers were (and are 
sometimes still) also dependent on the farmer to provide necessities, often creating a 
cycle of indebtedness. 
 
After 1994, the LRA and BCEA provided legal protection to agricultural workers. 
Even though no minimum wage was set at the time, they provided a general 
framework for employment conditions with, inter alia, the regulation of working 
hours and the abolition of child labour. Moreover, in order to transform the structure 
of land ownership in the country, as well as to ensure political, social and economic 
stability, the government launched a land reform programme. Besides land transfers, 
tenure reform aimed at securing land rights for non-Whites. To protect agricultural 
workers’ land rights, Parliament passed the Labour Tenants Act (LTA) in 1996 and 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) in 1997, which provided a legal 
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framework for evictions. With the exception of people who have worked and lived for 
more than 20 years on a farm, these laws do not protect workers’ residency rights; 
they nonetheless guarantee that a court would control evictions. Subsequently, in July 
2003, minimum wages were set according to a sectoral determination: Depending on 
location, they range today between R872 in rural areas and R950 in peri-urban 
areas52. 
 
Far from achieving their objectives, the new laws intended to protect farm workers are 
rarely implemented and in several cases have had a negative impact on the working 
and living conditions of farm workers. An increase in evictions has been observed 
since 1994 in reaction to the implementation of the LRA, ETA and ESTA laws and to 
the establishment of minimum wages. Nkuzi Development Association estimates that 
approximately 930,000 farm workers have been evicted since 1994, a 13% increase 
compared to the ten years preceding the first democratic elections53. According to 
O’Keefe, citing a study by Social Surveys Africa conducted in 2005, there were 
199,611 households evicted from their land compared to 164,185 households 
benefiting from land reform programmes between 1994 and 200454. Only 1% of these 
evictions was reported and conducted according to proper legal procedures. The 
majority of those evicted had worked and lived on the land for generations; not only 
did they lose their jobs but also their homes. According to Nkuzi, only 8% of the 
evicted found new work (and therefore new accommodation) as farm workers, 14% 
moved to the former Bantustans and reserves where access to over-crowded 
communal land is uncertain, 48% relocated to townships and 30% were reduced to 
illegal land occupation55. 
 
Regarding the working conditions, even if a union of farm workers, SAAPAWU, 
which was subsequently integrated with FAWU (see supra), developed since 1994 
and claims to have 300,000 members (most of whom are employed in food processing 
industries or catering), it has not succeeded in improving labour conditions in the 
sector. 68% of farm workers live in extreme poverty: in 2004, one year after the 
implementation of minimum wages, the average monthly salary of farm workers was 
estimated at R529 for men and R332 for women56, while the South African Human 
Rights Commission even reported salaries of R60 per month57. Eleven to twelve hour 
working days (without compensation) are commonly found and child labour is far 
from having disappeared. The rules concerning health and safety are rarely respected 
and the living conditions of workers remain very insecure in the majority of cases: 
many are housed in shacks (often made of corrugated iron) without electricity, 
running water or sanitation. 
 
In addition, the above-mentioned measures implemented to protect workers rights 
increased tensions between farm owners and farm workers, exacerbating the 
atmosphere of mistrust and conflict58. In order to prevent workers form joining a 
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union and to avoid having to abide by the LTA and ESTA laws (i.e. securing workers’ 
land rights), farm owners have made living conditions unbearable to force workers 
away: homes have been demolished, electricity and water cut off, etc. The new 
measures have also induced changes in practices and have accelerated the evolution of 
the social division of labour. In order to limit the number of workers, farm owners 
have mechanised their activities and have turned to less labour-intensive activities 
(such as game farms for tourism). The use of a seasonal and/or temporary workforce 
increasingly made up of foreign workers, mostly Zimbabwean and Mozambican 
(generally employed illegally), also becomes more and more frequent. These illegal 
workers are victims of abuse that is rarely reported or punished.  
 
Numerous cases of violence, including murder (besides the many farm workers killed 
since 1994, more than 1500 landowners and farmers have been murdered59) have been 
reported, and are linked to the social demands of the landless and other rural poor, to 
growing inequality, to poor working and living conditions and to farm labour 
relations. Because of the link between agricultural work and access to land inherited 
from apartheid, working conditions determine (even more than in other sectors) the 
living and reproduction conditions of farm workers and their families. It is against this 
incredibly harsh background that workers’ brutality targeting white farmers should be 
interpreted, bearing in mind that union weakness forces them to act alone and outside 
of any political articulation. 
 
To be added: 
- Corporisation of agriculture – also leading to subcontracting wave 
- Proletarisation of agriculture 
 
 
Unfulfilled Expectations and the Post-Apartheid Disenchantment 
 
South Africa’s transition has profoundly impacted workers, yet has not improved their 
situation; it has been accompanied by a casualisation of their status and conditions, as 
demonstrated in the three case studies presented in this article. While the desire to 
transform an exploitative labour regime, characterised by extra-economic coercion 
(i.e., relying on physical constraint to discipline workers), has been manifest in law, 
little has been done by the new Government to transform the concrete reality of the 
workplace. Employers, on the contrary, have adapted to political change by shifting to 
economic coercion: thanks to high unemployment, in South Africa and in 
neighbouring countries, and to casualisation, workers are now bent by the dull 
compulsion of economic forces. The importance of this evolution cannot be 
underestimated in a country where violence in working relations was the day-to-day 
form of racial oppression. Although the advent of democracy met the political 
expectations of the majority, the protective labour law adopted by the new 
Government did not prevent, when it did not aggravate, the persistence of 
exploitation, deceiving the hopes of poor (i.e. most) South Africans. The roots of this 
disenchantment can be found, in the three sectors analysed, in specific dynamics that 
can be grouped in two main tendencies, also found across South African society and 
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economy: economic liberalisation and the withdrawal of the State on the one hand; 
and the South African specificity of racial segregation on the other hand. 
 
Since 1996, although it did not have to implement any structural adjustment plan, 
South Africa has liberalised its economy and has greatly limited the role of the State, 
especially with regard to economic intervention60. South Africa’s economic actors 
have adapted in different ways to a post-apartheid situation characterised not only by 
a new socio-political context, but also by an economic restructuring involving the end 
of active support from the State to selected “national champions” combined with 
international opening. The private sector responded with a substitution of labour with 
capital, the creation of temporary enterprises and, most of all, with massive 
outsourcing, which allowed it to reduce costs and to make working arrangements 
highly flexible. Businesses also anticipated increased so-called labour market 
‘rigidity’ linked to a rise in labour costs and in workers’ rights generally. Yet, we 
observed a rapid casualisation of workers’ statuses as well as conditions through the 
increased use of temporary contracts, informal labour and task-based payment. In 
many sectors a movement towards the restoration of a tractable, un-unionised 
workforce is at work, which is continuously reducing, through means not always 
understood by workers (like task-based remuneration), the part of value added 
allocated to labour, who is forced to assume a growing part of risks. These tendencies 
are particularly present in the mining and forestry sectors, where labour conditions 
had improved during the years of union and political struggles preceding the end of 
apartheid. In addition, the “productive reorganisation” of these sectors was the only 
option proposed to reduce unemployment and poverty. 
 
This first dynamic and its implications bear a striking resemblance to the evolution of 
working conditions in other “globalised” economies and followed, as noted by 
numerous economists and sociologists, a reorganisation inspired by the “new spirit of 
capitalism”, traced by Boltanski and Chiapello61. This reorganisation has been 
accompanied by ‘market-friendly’ macro economic policies in South Africa. After a 
brief initial phase of fiscal largesse (during the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme) aimed at addressing some of the structural inequalities inherited from 
apartheid, monetary and even fiscal policies have been very prudent since 1996; the 
Government even ran a R11 billion budget surplus in 2007. 
 
The case studies, however, reveal a liberalisation with a specifically South African 
flavour. Although international competition has certainly motivated, in some cases, 
productive reorganisation, South African employers were equally influenced, 
particularly in agriculture and forestry, by the fear of seeing yesterday’s subordinate 
workforce demanding and exercising new rights to redress past wrongs. The case 
studies presented here unambiguously indicate that outsourcing and casualisation 
have been reactions to this perceived threat and to fears that labour discipline would 
be impossible to implement in a “free” workplace regime. Other studies confirm 
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them, including one conducted on the contracting out of cleaning services at Wits 
University by Bezuidenhout and Fakier62. It is also interesting to note that 
liberalisation and the withdrawal of the State were the exact opposite of segregationist 
policies, the main instruments of apartheid. This is one of the main sources of the 
popularity of liberalisation among South African elite, both black and white: the 
apartheid leviathan must be abandoned through a liberal policy that limits State 
intervention. But the relevance of this hostile rhetoric towards the State can be 
questioned in a country where social and racial tensions are very high and where the 
transition has bypassed a transformation of the productive apparatus, social relations 
and income structure. The implementation of liberal policies further facilitates, in 
South Africa, the persistence of a racial and social hierarchy in the name of the 
supposed benefits of the free market. The political and economic orientations adopted 
and analysed here in the context of the evolution of labour conditions do not 
demonstrate any will or capacity for profound transformation. 
 
Differing from other countries, where crises have typically been periods characterised 
by a redefinition of wage relations, leading to the implementation of new relations of 
production, new management practices of the workforce as well as new forms of 
consumption,63 South Africa witnesses the emergence of new forms of employment 
that reflect a continuation of racial subordination, without reconfiguring the inherited 
apartheid wage relations. These new forms of employment, presenting more labour 
precariousness, facilitate the sidestepping of restructuring and limit the actual 
transformation of South African society. The observation of workplace politics 
highlights social conflicts, whose importance is essential to shed light on the 
country’s economic and political transformation (or lack thereof). It seems somewhat 
utopian to expect a restructuring of South African society on the basis of limited 
reforms. The sectors that have few unions (agriculture), or whose unions have lost 
their will or ability to fight, sometimes because of their proximity with political 
power, offer good examples: the simple declaration of measures supposed to protect 
workers’ rights had little effect but that of accelerating the deterioration of working 
and living conditions of the least protected. 
 
The casualisation of work is even more worrisome since it is accompanied by a 
withdrawal of the State and the end of the paternalism of apartheid. As Barchiesi 
remarks: 
Macroeconomic paradigms have greatly constrained the government’s 
ability to use state expenditures and social grants to address massive 
poverty and social inequality arising from the country’s deepening 
employment crisis. The ANC government has therefore opted for 
symbolic compensation by continuously praising wage labour as the 
cornerstone of social discipline and inclusion. In this way it has, 
ironically, operated in substantial continuity with Apartheid-era social 
policy discourse, which, moreover, and similarly to the post-1994 
dispensation, praised community self-help and family support as 
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Because of the historical weakness of social policy and of the persistence of mass 
unemployment (estimated at 23,1% for the 2nd quarter of 2008, a figure which would 
almost double if “discouraged” work seekers were included65), a strong family- and 
community-based solidarity subsists in South Africa. Most workers work to support 
their family; this points to another consequence, difficult to quantify but obviously 
dramatic, of labour casualisation. The ability of the employed to save money for their 
family has been drastically reduced, impacting an important number of (often 
invisible) dependents and unemployed who rely on this support to survive. For 
agricultural workers and their families, this even translates into the loss of access to 
land and housing. Another factor is the increase of the active population linked to the 
feminisation of the workforce66, and to the high number of foreigners in South Africa. 
Women and foreigners are replacing the men of the country, who can no longer 
provide for the needs of their family with reduced income from precarious jobs. The 
employment crisis – unemployment and casualisation – thus induces a general crisis 
of social reproduction. 
 
The workers described in this article are, in the full sense of the term, “working poor”. 
Their difficulties, shared by a large portion of the population, are not fully 
acknowledged by policy-makers, who at best address this situation with 
“accompanying measures”. Improvements in working conditions are also often seen 
as secondary given the high level of unemployment and are silenced by a solemn call 
for necessary adaptation: work must become more flexible to enhance 
competitiveness and job creation. This economic strategy is the only means envisaged 
by those who have thus far ruled South Africa to restructure and deracialise the 
economy; it reflects the transition compromise struck between the ANC and the large 
South African conglomerates67. Thus, the development of black small, medium and 
micro enterprises (SMMEs) through preferential contracting (BEE) is imposed like a 
dogma, as it is perceived to be a component of a necessary trajectory (the creation of a 
black bourgeoisie), and a vehicle for the transformation of society; it has also, 
however, increased the flexibility and exploitation of the black workforce. 
 
The improvements of working conditions obtained during the last years of apartheid, 
through the pressure of union battles against despotic, often violent, practices, were 
followed by a casualisation that has exposed workers to the “dull compulsions of 
economic forces” (in Marx’s terms). This faceless violence, presented as necessary, is 
one that labourers must impose on themselves. It appears, fourteen years after the end 
of apartheid, under which labour markets (and society) were segmented by law, that 
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inequality and the belief in the progressiveness of unfettered markets have 
perpetuated a dual labour market68. This outcome is strikingly (and tragically) ironic: 
access to new, much awaited, political rights is concomitant to a collapse of the 
material means of actually using them! This labour crisis points to the essential and 
potentially destabilising contradiction of the economic policies that the South African 
government has followed since 1994, mixing economic liberalism and wilful 
redistribution. The Polokwane landslide in favour of Jacob Zuma (or possibly against 
Thabo Mbeki) and recent xenophobic violence undoubtedly indicate that this model 
of development is reaching its limits in terms of political tolerability. The general 
elections planned for April-May 2009 carry a sense of immense (although vague) 
hope and apprehension. 
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